THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR
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Tony Archer. Military Involvement Nina M. Congressional Research Service, 18 May Armed Forces Journal , 03 April Posted on the American Enterprise Institute. Defense and the National Interest, 29 March Clifford M. Air and Space Power Journal , 06 March Defense and the National Interest, March Army War College, March The Washington Quarterly , Spring Parameters , Spring Looking out from the Forest of Iraq William Christie.
Defense and the National Interest, 31 January Congressional Research Service, 27 January Complex Irregular Warfare Frank G. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 06 January Joint Force Quarterly , January David H. Counterinsurgency and Political Control: U. Institute for Development and Peace, Hosmer and Sibylle O. Jones et al. CSIS, December Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 November Posted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
House of Representatives, 09 November CSIS, 07 November Posted on the University of Szeged, Hungary, website. Strategic Insights , October Naval Postgraduate School.
- A Revolution in Warfare!
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Imperial Grunts Robert D. The Atlantic Monthly , October Small Wars Journal Magazine , July Strategic Studies Institute, June Timothy A. Army War College, 18 March Strategic Studies Institute, March Small Wars Journal , 20 February Strategic Forum , January David P. In the Wake of War: Improving U. Louis A. Combat Studies Institute, Glenn and Gina Kingston. RAND , Strategic Studies Institute, November Heritage Foundation, 13 July Army Force Structure Requirements.
Jason L. Gompert, et. RAND, April Klare and Rachel Stohl. UN Foundation, Spring Marines Rediscover a s Manual -Empire? Wall Street Journal , 08 April Posted on Global Policy Forum website. Stretching the Network David c. Gompert, et al. Rand, April Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare Robert R. Rand, January RAND, January Rolf Wagner.
Washington Post , 24 November Posted on the Office of Force Transformation web site. Project for the New American Century, 03 November Australian Government, Department of Defense, August G2mil, March Social Science Research Council, 19 Feb Byman, et al. Posted on the Federation of American Scientists website. IT Requirements for "Policekeeping" Lt. Timothy L.
Military Review, September-October Harvard International Review, Summer Airpower and the Coercive Use of Force. Scott Cooper. Here's why the future of robotic warfare might be subterranean. Draper Labs, working under a grant from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is creating centimeter-sized robots, for future use in rescue work.
Non Contact Warfare (NCW) – Managing Conflict in 21st Century
Skyborg details revealed Defense News Find out the details on how the Air Force wants to use wingman drones. V competes agility tests Defense News The Bell V Valor has completed agility tests, completing its primary flight test program.
Freedberg Jr. Panelists will also address the ongoing debate about the impact of artificial intelligence and robotics on standards of living and the relevant facts and data to consider. Donnelly , War on the Rocks: "In many ways, multi-domain operations represent a more sophisticated conceptualization of joint operations, but it is also context agnostic in that it is not meant to be a response to a specific strategic challenge. The U. Ron Boxall said the Navy is going to get its High Energy Laser and Integrated Optical-dazzler with Surveillance system on the Hawaii-based destroyer Preble in , a moment that he compared with Spanish conquistador Hernan Cortez ordering his own ships scuttled to motivate his men.
John Schaus writes: Since October, U. Army War College researchers have looked into Indo-Pacific theater design at and beyond on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. Though we have found that U. The Pentagon wants AI to assist human combatants, not replace them. The issue is what happens once humans start taking military advice — or even orders — from machines.
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Once again in my life our Army is reassessing how it will fight large-scale ground combat operations against peer and near-peer adversaries, possibly while outnumbered. The military needs a globe-spanning network to counter threats that no single theater command can cope with. That takes more than just technology. The defense community suffered a grave loss on the morning of Tuesday, March 26, with the passing of Andrew W. Marshall at age Although the latter stressed the urgent need for additional resources for defense, it also acknowledged that bigger budgets would likely prove insufficient to support the national defense strategy.
ECHEVARRIA: WAR AND POLITICS
Needed are new ways of war that can bridge the gap between our ends and our means. To date, however, the Pentagon has been silent on the topic of innovative operational concepts: what they should be and who should develop them. The Fiscal National Defense Authorization Act that Congress is currently considering offers an opportunity to spur needed action in this area.
In the s, it reveled in notions of the "unipolar moment" and the "end of history. The need to win the wars we were already fighting took precedence over the responsibility to prepare for the very different wars we might have to fight in the future. In such an environment, the Defense Department embraced, explicitly or implicitly, a series of optimistic strategic assumptions, to include: The United States will face one adversary at a time; The United States will be a sanctuary from adversary attack; The United States will have assured access to critical facilities and locations on allied and partner territory; and A conflict with China would be a local war confined to a portion of the Western Pacific, would be short, and would have a clear beginning and end.
The growth of Chinese military power has rendered these assumptions questionable, if not obsolete. Rather, the National Defense Strategy Commission found that today the United States and its allies face a series of operational challenges: Protecting critical bases of operations, including the U. In an era of constrained resources, those concepts and capabilities that offer the greatest strategic and operational leverage should receive preferential funding over those that do not. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff should lead the development of joint operational concepts, including efforts both to use existing capabilities in new and innovative ways as well as to craft roles for truly new capabilities.
Congress can spark the development of innovative operational concepts by requiring and funding experiments and demonstrations and demanding realistic assessments of them. Several subordinate efforts appear particularly promising. First, the U. The Defense Department could use the aircraft to develop innovative concepts of operations for stealthy land- and sea-based unmanned systems, to include the value of autonomy in such systems as well as the use of innovative logistical concepts to extend their range.
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The attributes of these ships, to include their stealth, large displacement, and electric propulsion, make them both unique as surface combatants as well as potentially valuable assets for experimentation. Specifically, they could be used to determine the value of stealthy surface combatants for conducting anti-air, anti-surface, and strike warfare in denied environments. Accordingly, the Defense Department should develop concepts to integrate LRASM onto the B-2 stealth bomber, which has the range and survivability that may be needed to reach Chinese or Russian shipping in defended waters.
Should the concept prove successful, LRASM could subsequently be integrated onto the forthcoming B bomber, which should be available in greater numbers than the B-2 for missions such as maritime strike.
Each of the Services is developing capabilities that could be used to create anti-access challenges for competitors. The Army and Marine Corps are both exploring deploying land-based anti-ship missiles such as LRASM, the Naval Strike Missile, and Maritime Strike Tomahawk; the Navy is modernizing its anti-ship and land-attack capabilities; and, as described above, the Air Force plans to equip some of its aircraft with anti-ship missiles. Further experiments and demonstrations could yield innovative operational concepts for linking U. The United States should develop innovative operational concepts for defending those bases.
Such defenses could include medium-range high-energy lasers HEL , high-power microwave HPM systems, guided projectiles launched by rapid- ring guns, and low-cost surface-to-air missiles. But Clausewitz, too, deserves some blame, for he neglected to define in simple language how he wanted this multivalent term to be understood. Indeed, German scholars and soldiers alike have puzzled over this question since the late nineteenth century. Historian Eberhard Kessel argued, for example, that, for Clausewitz, Politik consisted of subjective and objective elements.
The former pertained to the choice or choices made by the political leadership regarding the type of war to be waged and the specific aims to be pursued. The latter involved the dominant ideas, emotions, and political interrelationships unique to a given time and place. In fact, Clausewitz's varied usage of Politik and the historical context within which he wrote indicate that he meant three things by the term. First, Clausewitz did intend Politik to mean policy, the extension of the will of the state, the decision to pursue a goal, political or otherwise.
Second, Politik also meant politics as an external state of affairs, the strengths and weaknesses provided to a state by its geo-political position, its resources, alliances and treaties, and as an ongoing process of internal interaction between a state's key decision-making institutions and the personalities of its policy makers. Lastly, Clausewitz used Politik as an historically causative force, providing an explanatory pattern or framework for coherently viewing war's various manifestations over time.
The first of these definitions is found predominantly in On War , Chapter 1 of Book I, which discusses war's nature. Because Clausewitz's undated prefatory note the one presumably written in indicates that he considered only this chapter to be in final form, the temptation is great not to read beyond it. But readers must resist this temptation, for, while it may appear that the essence of what Clausewitz had to say about war might be grasped at the cost of reading fifteen pages rather than or over in the latest German edition , this is not the case.
In fact, as one historian has pointed out, strong though circumstantial evidence exists suggesting that the undated note was written some time before the note of , and that On War is closer to completion than Clausewitzian scholars had previously believed. His notes on history and politics and his essay on "Agitation" Umtriebe , for example, show that his thought was continually evolving, and the hefty tome On War represents barely a third of it.